

The Limits of Hospitality in the Mexican- United States Border

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Abstract. This paper deconstructs the idea of *universal hospitality* (Kant, *Perpetual Peace* [1795] & *The Metaphysics of Morals* [1797]) from a political-ethical point of view, based on the *unconditional hospitality law* (Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism* [1997] & *Of Hospitality* [1997]). It compares both proposals in order to establish a theoretic guide that could serve to understand an ontological and epistemological problem immersed in the discussion of the border, and even in the discussion of the modern nation: the citizen vs. the foreign, not only as subjects, (but also as part of the entitlement and political system).

Keywords: Hospitality, Mexico-US border, ethics, policies, migration & border phenomena.

The Limits of *Hospitality* in the Mexican-United States Border*

*We have to send a clear message:
just because your child gets across the border,
that doesn't mean the child gets to stay.*

Hillary Clinton

As we know, during the last years the US government had put together different proposals for the anti-immigration laws such as, Supreme Court vs. Arizona, and the revision of the Immigration reform that the Obama administration forwarded and recently abandoned because of the “humanitarian crisis” at the US-Mexican border. Meanwhile, the Mexican government has proposed different public policies centered around national security (in place of human security) but has not renewed the immigration system that is involved in organized crime, traffic of drugs and arms, or control of contraband.

Many aspects of migration have to be rethought because the Mexican-US border is performing different and more complex problems that have to be solved immediately, such as the child immigration phenomena that crosses over different countries from Central America to the North Mexican border. This situation is exceptional because half of the children that are crossing the border in South Texas could qualify for humanitarian protection under US law (in particular those that came from Honduras, El Salvador or Guatemala). However, Obama’s government is trying to deport the Central American children as soon as possible to deny them the asylum. In this sense, do the people fleeing persecution have the right of obtain legal documents? Or as Seyla Benhabib asks: “Is it morally permissible to deny asylum when admitting large numbers of needy people into our territories would cause a decline in our stands of living?” (2004: 36-37).

As I started studying the Mexico-United States geopolitical border and the societies on both sides of it (southern states of United States and northern states of Mexico), I realized that in order to understand the border(s), as well as to be able to criticize the hegemonic and monocultural discourses that coexist within different kinds of exclusion, racism, anti-immigrant or antiterrorism practices at the border and in both countries, it is necessary to deconstruct different cultural phenomena; such as the identity performing process of the subjects that inhabit the border (Mexican or Mexican American subjects), the language interdiction (English vs. Spanish), the recognition of the other (Mexican or Latin American immigrants), the collective imaginary representation (artistic representation), among others.¹

However, the analysis of these phenomena is not enough to emphasize the necessity of recognizing the otherness to establish public and cultural policies that benefit border society (and migrants). So, in this text I will deconstruct the idea of *universal hospitality* (Kant 1917, 2013) from a political-ethical point of view based on the *unconditional hospitality law* (Derrida 1997a, 1997b, 2000, 2001). Therefore, I will compare both proposals in order to establish a theoretic guide that could serve to understand an ontological and epistemological problem immersed in the discussion of the border, and

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¹ For an analysis of these different cultural border phenomena that includes language, literature and social approach, see Rodríguez 2013b.

even in the discussion of the modern nation: the citizen vs. the foreigner, not only as subjects, but also, as part of the entitlement and political system.

Kant: The idea of universal hospitality

To analyze the idea of universal hospitality and the right to cosmopolitanism from a Kantian perspective it is essential to study several texts, in particular *Perpetual Peace* [1795] and *The Metaphysics of Morals* [1797]. In these texts it is possible for knowledge to transit from fact to right in the transcendental deduction.² I.e. according to Kant's reading, in a given territory (Earth) people should coexist with the other because of the finitude of such territory, so it is necessary to implement a civil constitution that regulates the relationships between states, people or individuals. This constitution should be established by taking into consideration perpetual peace (right of the state, right of the nations as a state) and the consolidation of a cosmopolitan state (state to all nations) (Kant 1917).

In Kant's proposal, it is possible to observe the current dilemma between universal hospitality and globalization juridical speeches. In this sense, if we thought in Kantian universal hospitality perspective, what should we do with the foreigner, with that person who is not like me? How do we justify the war without misunderstanding Kant's juridical doctrine (*Rechtslehre*)? How do we justify the invasion of a territory?

In *Perpetual Peace*, Kant points out the necessity to establish the human public right as a way to consolidate perpetual peace and the confirmation of a cosmopolitan state under the premise that a right violation in any part of the world should affect the rest of it:

Hence the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastical, high-flown notion of right, but a complement of the unwritten code of law—constitutional as well as international law—necessary for the public rights of perpetual peace. For only by endeavoring to fulfill the conditions laid down by the cosmopolitan law we flatter ourselves that we are gradually approaching that ideal (Kant 1917: 142).

However, in this case, at the moment of establishing the juridical policies that are worth a cosmopolitan right, Kant confuses deontological with ontological because he does not take into consideration the world's sensible limitations, as we can observe in the Kantian definition of hospitality (*Wirthbarkeit*):

We are speaking here, as in the previous articles, not of philanthropy, but of *right*; an in this sphere *hospitality* signifies the claim of a stranger entering foreign territory to be treated by its owner without hostility. The latter may send him away again, if this can be done without causing his death; but, so long as he conducts himself peaceably, he must not be treated as an enemy (ibid.: 137)

² Kant address this idea in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, § 26: "In the *metaphysical deduction* the *a priori* origin of the categories has been proved through their complete agreement with the general logical functions of thought; in the *transcendental deduction* we have shown their possibility as *a priori* modes of knowledge of objects of an intuition in general (§20, 21). We have now to explain the possibility of knowing *a priori*, by means of *categories*, whatever objects may *present themselves to our senses*, not indeed in respect of the form of their intuition, but in respect of the laws of their combination, and so, as it were, of prescribing laws to nature, and even of making nature possible. For unless the categories discharged this function, there could be no explaining why everything that can be presented to our senses must be subject to laws which have their origin *a priori* in the understanding alone" (Kant 1929: 170).

Nevertheless, it is unclear under which conditions Kant defines *peaceably* versus *hostility*. Who is the stranger? Where does the right of a guest or the right of a visitor belong? With the juridical right, or the natural right?

Further, in this same text, Kant addresses the right of hospitality and affirms that the privilege of foreign arrivals “does not amount to more than what is implied in a permission to make attempt at intercourse with the original inhabitants” (ibid.: 139), due to the fact that the relationship between the foreigner and the other (the citizen) can only be given in two different levels (pacific relationships, and public and legal relationships) with the intention to establish a cosmopolitan state.

In this sense, Kant beholds with gratitude the mode that some countries, specifically China and Japan, established certain policies to interact with outsiders because these countries “had made an attempt at receiving guests of his kind, have now taken a prudent step” (ibid.: 140-1). It means, a limited and conditional access to certain commercial practices. Nevertheless, when Kant refers to the conquering of the non-civilized continents, like Africa or America, he only presumes to say that this conquering was “the inhospitable behavior of the civilized nations, especially the commercial states of our continent” (ibid.: 139).

In spite of the dissertations in which Kant tries to conform a *juridical* doctrine (*Rechtslehre*),³ such dissertations could serve to understand historical situations of coexistence; as we can observe in the idea of external freedom (*rightful*), in which Kant sustains his own doctrine:

Rightful (consequently external) *freedom* cannot be defined in the way it usually is, as the privilege to do whatever one will as long as one does no wrong. For what does privilege mean? The possibility of action as long as one does no wrong. Thus, the clarification would read: Freedom is the possibility of action as long as one does no wrong. One does no wrong (one may thus do what one wills), if only does no wrong. This is a mere empty tautology. Instead, external (*rightful*) freedom is to be clarified as follows: It is the privilege not to obey any external laws except those to which I have been able to give my consent. In just the same way, external (*rightful*) *equality* in a nation is that relation among citizens whereby no citizen can be bound by a law, unless all are subject to it simultaneously and in the very same way. (The principle of *rightful* dependence requires no clarification, for it is already contained in the concept of political constitution in general.) (Kant [1795] 2003: 8)

These dissertations result insufficient when we try to put them into practice, precisely for the limitations embedded in a cosmopolitan coexistence between states and countries with significant economic disparities and meaningful cultural differences that share one or several borders.

In *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant stresses in the problem of usage of soil (acquisition-occupancy; possession-residency) to justify the consolidation of state. Kant addresses the dissertation about private property when affirms that “all nations stand *originally* in a community of land, though not of *rightful* community of possession (*communio*) and so

³ I have consulted several English translations of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” essay, amending the text when necessary. The use of *juridical* as synonymous of *rightful* allows the intelligible deconstruction of the deontological hospitality, because it is used as “pertaining to the rights of men” (Kant [1795] 2003: 37). I.e.: “Kant establishes that a subject can be in the state of having something external as her own only if she exists in a juridical condition (*rechtlicher Zustand*) involving a publicly legislative power. Such a power requires a civil constitution that conforms with the universal principle and a priori laws of right set forth as principles of the natural law in the Doctrine of Right.” (Edwards, 2011: 152)

of use of it, or of property in it; instead they stand in a community of possible physical *interaction (commercium)*” (Kant 1996, §62: 162). In this sense, “This right, since it has to do with the possible union of all nations with a view to certain universal laws for the possible commerce, can be called cosmopolitan right (*ius cosmopolitanicum*)” (ibid.).

That is therefore to justify the transition from natural state to civil state. In Kant’s proposal, this transition assumes a spatial perspective, more than a cosmopolitan discussion, because if the earth were “an unbounded plain, people could be so dispersed on it that they would not come into any community with one another, and community would not be a necessary result of their existence on the earth.” (ibid., §13: 86).

Following this argument, in the current political and philosophical debate, Seyla Benhabib asks if Kant does not fall into a “naturalistic fallacy”, when he refers to the sphere-shaped of Earth in order to justify the cosmopolitan right:

Does Kant mean to derive or deduce cosmopolitan right from the *fact* of the sphericity of the earth’s surface? What is the status of this *fact* in Kant’s moral argument? If indeed we were to assume that Kant used sphericity of the earth as a *justificatory premise*, wouldn’t we then have to conclude that he had committed the naturalistic fallacy? (Benhabib 2004: 33)

Meanwhile Katrin Flikschuh sustains that when Kant refers to the spatial implications of a spherical Earth, he does it by thinking of the empirical space like a *circumstance of justice*, “in which the human’s agency limits are constrained to establish possible relationships of right” (Benhabib 2004: 34-35); of cosmopolitan right. Flikschuh understands by circumstances of justice “the conditions of our possible agency”; it means, “the sphericity of the earth’s surface functions for Kant as a limiting condition of ‘outer freedom’” (ibid.: 35). Flikschuh is trying to rescue Kant’s political philosophy after the Rawlsian interpretation. She argues that the main lecture of his political lecture addresses the categorical imperative instead of his *Rechtslehre*.

As a circumstance of justice or as a justified premise of cosmopolitan right, for Kant the occupancy of soil is a morally practical law because “for only in accordance with this principle of the will is it possible for the free choice of each to accord with the freedom of all, and therefore possible for there to be any right, and so too possible for any external object to be mine or yours” (Kant 1996, §14: 89). This means that a morally practical law “is a proposition that contains a categorical imperative (a command). One who commands (*imperans*) through a law is the lawgiver (*legislator*). He is the author (*auctor*) of the obligation in accordance with the law, but not always the author of the law (ibid.: 53-54).

So on, for the matter of this paper, I would like to emphasize that Derrida deconstructs the categorical imperative when he alludes to the unconditional law of hospitality, referring to ‘categorical’ as ‘unconditional’, i.e. as an absolute concept, not as a juridical one.

Derrida: the unconditional hospitality law

In *Of Hospitality*, Derrida deconstructs the ‘categorical imperative’ from which it derives the Kantian law of universal hospitality in order to disclose the antinomic usage of ‘categorical’ that confused deontological with ontological. In this book, Derrida endeavors to detangle the law of hospitality, arguing that if we use ‘categorical’ as synonym of ‘unconditional’, we fall into the error of misinterpreting the law of hospitality because the categorical imperative stipulates a conditional welcome. Meanwhile the

usage of the unconditional concept assumes a welcome without condition. As a result, Derrida affirms that an antinomic approach exists not only in the way that hospitality is thought of, but also in how it is implemented. Therefore, Derrida's law of absolute hospitality (unconditional) contradicts the hospitality of right (moral-practical) that Kant refers to.

To put in different terms, absolute hospitality requires that I open up my home and that I give not only to the foreigner (provided with a family name, with the social status of being a foreigner, etc.), but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and that *I give place* to them, that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names. The law of absolute hospitality commands a break with hospitality by right, with law or justice as rights (Derrida 2000: 25).

Further ahead, Derrida goes on with this deontological analysis of hospitality and elaborates a series of questions that reaffirm the paradox law of hospitality, while Kant's perspective affirms that the foreigner could be rejected if he does not behave peacefully. Derrida goes deeper in detail and questions if the foreigner should be interrogated, asked for his name, his last name or his juridical situation and the motive of his stay in the country.

What I am going to call you by your name? It is also what we sometimes tenderly ask children and those we love. Or else does hospitality begin with the unquestioning welcome, in a double effacement, in the effacement of the question *and* the name? [...] Does one give hospitality to a subject? to an identifiable subject? Or is hospitality *rendered*, is it *given* to the other before they are identified, even before they are (posited as or supposed to be) a subject, legal subject and subject nameable by their family name, etc.? (Derrida 2000: 27-28)

In this regard, Derrida, opens the debate to another type of analysis related with the use of certain concepts such as; subject of right, citizen, foreigner, guest, immigrant and refugee. These concepts are not completely clear in this text but are intimately linked with hospitality not only in a deontological level, also in a socio-ontological level. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that Derrida does not adrift those concepts due to the fact that the analysis of such are present in other books, though it is necessary to do a transversal reading to complete the puzzle. At this time, I will not continue to get deeper in these concepts although I should emphasize the importance to do a complete study of such concepts to understand the current migration phenomena, as well as border zones. Now then, what are the structural reasons and the internal contradictions in Derrida's analysis according to the law of hospitality? On one hand, we can notice what has been previously mentioned: a paradox between unconditional hospitality and the right that conditions hospitality. At this time, the internal contradiction remains in how the law of hospitality should be written in a rule of law. In who or whom should we think of when we speak about a conditioned ethic or conditioned policy?

On the other hand, Derrida affirms that the structure of hospitable right is based in a conjugal-phallogocentric model where "the owner of the household" is the one who makes the rules. In this case, the dilemma of the law of hospitality is an ethical dilemma, as a matter of fact in certain situations such law is above morality. In this case, Derrida gives

the example of Lot's daughters, but also, we should think of the drawings of geopolitical frontiers from the founding of the modern state or the occupancy of land for certain entities by religious title; I refer specifically to the Israel-Palestinian occupancy.

So, as we've seen so far, Derrida is thinking of a hospitality that does not question the juridical state of a person, he thinks of a hospitality of open doors to others, no matter their origin, and without conditioning them to certain moral obligations. What we can clearly notice is precisely the practice of the opposite: a worsening of laws, mainly the anti-immigration ones and a reinforcement of geopolitical frontiers.

The political-juridical examples of hospitality that Derrida gives refer to a constant deontological conditioning that is above the respect of cultural difference, precisely in countries that were colonized (Derrida thinks of Algeria) or in other countries where historically conflicted geopolitical frontiers are sheared, such as the Mexico-US border, which I will analyze further ahead in detail. So, if the practice is so detached from theory, we could think as Derrida mentions, of a policy, of a rule of law, of an ethic that answers to the current demanding new end societies. Where not only their behavior is questioned, but also where their democracy, their institutional right, their citizenship, among others should be redefined.

The Limits of Hospitality in the Mexican-United States Border, or "show me your papers"

To understand the dilemma of migration and border zones in the Mexican-US border, the hospitality debate is a central issue. More so, when it is essential to deconstruct the concept of border to rethink public policies that benefit the communities that inhabit both sides of the border, and specifically the irregular immigrants.

If the law of hospitality responds to a conditioned policy, then the current migration is a necessary evil to the enrichment of a few; those who through discourse and in practice repress migrants. Henceforth, I consider that there are a few situations that need to be resolved. The first being that if governments have passed on their social labor responsibility to the economic system, what are the functions of the state in respect to the border zones? Secondly, if the establishment of the border zones has altered the monocultural discursive practices, should the state be able to incorporate further political changes to a nation project, which would benefit both border societies?

Due to its historical occupancy, and more so when the economic coexistence persists amid both countries (cheaper labor versus absence of an employment policy), the Mexican-US border has been particularly conflictive; hence its geopolitical establishment in 1848. Not necessarily on a belligerent level, but on a socio-cultural one. The migration crisis between both countries has become one with a snowball effect, because neither one of the two governments implicated has been able to establish binational (or transnational) migration policies that perform on a federal level, rather just locally. Such as we have observed during the last decade:

The large number of migrant's families is an unintended, even ironic, consequence of actions taken by Congress and successive administrations to make life miserable for immigrants regardless of legal status. Legislation enacted in 1996-limited access to federal benefits, curtailed civil rights and increased the risk of deportation. The well being of foreign nationals was further undermined by the USA Patriot Act in 2001 and was threatened in 2006 by the Sensenbrenner bill, which aimed to deter illegal immigration through the strict enforcement of

draconian new restrictions; it failed to become law, but a similar strategy underlies Arizona's 2010 anti-illegal-immigration law (Castañeda & Massey 2012).

These anti-immigration policies have been, as we know, hostile and above all inhospitable. These juridical policies rough the categorical imperative, but amid the universal duty and the incompressible irrationality of the other; the migrant, the foreigner. In this manner, the proposal of deconstructing the border concept implies, in the first place, to make a difference between the Kantian metaphysic of morals and the Derridian ontological perspective (that doesn't follow a rational discursive order), this difference presumes to rethink the concepts that circumscribe the migration and the border (citizen-foreigner-alien, inhabitant-immigrant, native-resident).

In second place, we have to improve policies by thinking for a socio-ontological subject that responds to an unprecedented coexistence phenomenon, precisely within his/her own precarious juridical existence. Derrida (2000) mentions a ruthless example of this situation known as "the hostage structure", as a mode to reorganize the National-State borders in Europe, but I think that this is just one of the ways from which a community could be recognized.

I will mention a few examples of what is society doing to enhance some changes at different levels of public participation. First, I will talk about the Mexican-American society and then, Mexican government policies forwarded by non-profit organizations.

The Mexican or Mexican-American communities promoted various policies to improve their juridical situation, that were recently supported by the US government:

a) Some analysts allude to the "defensive naturalization" as a manner in which Mexican community has appropriated a juridical figure: "In response, many Mexican permanent residents made an unexpected choice: Rather than leave the United States because they felt unwelcomed, they became citizens — a practice known as "defensive naturalization" (Castañeda & Massey 2012).

b) I support the idea of the agency [Butler] that the migrant performs as a "political subject" that interferes and stresses on the presidential elections through asking for a migration policy. For instance: "The Supreme Court on Monday delivered a split decision on Arizona's tough 2010 immigration law, upholding its most hotly debated provision, but blocking others on the grounds that they interfered with the federal government's role in setting immigration policy" (Liptak 2012). Also, we can highlight the young political movement called the 'Dream Act' that recently received the support of the Obama administration. The act is represented by "a temporary stopgap measure" that would "lift the shadow of deportation from these young people" and make immigration policy "more fair, more efficient and more just" (Preston & Cushman 2012).

The Mexican government has improved different proposals to attend the migration phenomenon since Peña Nieto assumed the presidency in 2012. Most of them are product of the civilian knowledge and experience (specially by non-profit organizations) in human rights defense and theoretical migration analysis. In this sense, the guidance and redaction of different policies proposals is the result of an assertive relation between society and government that had never existed before. I.e.: it is the first time that in a National Development Plan (2013-2018), the framework for all government policies, migration is presented as a national goal. Further, the Special Migration Program (2014-2018), a multi-sectorial and sub-national policy instrument, addresses the strategies and objectives of what could be considered an approach to redefine the migration policy. This

program consists in transform the way we think the migration: as national security policy or as human dignity paradigm.⁴

Is the asylum or refuge a hospitality ethical proposal for migration?

I started the text using Hillary Clinton's quote: "We have to send a clear message: just because your child gets across the border, that doesn't mean the child gets to stay" (Lind 2014). It refers to the future of the unaccompanied child migrants that cross Mexico with the hope to arrive at the United States and obtain humanitarian protection. This quote resumes the Derridian idea of "Step of Hospitality": "Between an unconditional law or an absolute desire for hospitality on the one hand and, on the other, a law, a politics, a conditional ethics, there is distinction, radical heterogeneity, but also indissociability" (Derrida 2000: 147).

More than 50,000 unaccompanied children from Central America have arrived during the last years to the United States. Most of them are crossing by the Río Grande Valley areas of the Southwest border (Texas). Obama has made some declarations about this urgent humanitarian situation in the same way as his migration policy: deportation (more than two million migrants have been deported during his administration). It means that the Obama administration will increase his policies of non-hospitality for anyone who crosses without papers. So, in a letter that President Obama read on June 26, 2014, called "Efforts to Address the Humanitarian Situation in the Rio Grande Valley Areas of Our Nation's Southwest Border", the efforts that his administration will do to resolve the problem respond to the Clinton's declaration, i.e.:

- Provide the DHS Secretary additional authority to exercise discretion in processing the return and removal of unaccompanied minor children from non-contiguous countries like Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador; and
- Implement an aggressive deterrence strategy focused on the removal and repatriation of recent border crossers (Obama 2014).

As we can observe there is no policy for legalizing undocumented migrants, no policy for support the children that left their countries because of marginalization situations, not only economical aspects, also violence or drug traffic abuse, this situation differs from the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008:

SEC. 104. Assistance for Victims of Trafficking in other Countries.

(ii) performance of best interest determinations for unaccompanied and separated children who come to the attention of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, its partner organizations, or any organization that contracts with the Department of State in order to identify child trafficking victims and to assist their safe integration, reintegration, and resettlement. (state.gov/jtip/laws/113178.htm).

⁴ A multi-layered analysis of this can be found in Rodríguez 2014. In this I proposed a theoretical methodology for study the border and migration phenomena based in three approaches (Prevention and Human Security, Comprehensive Development, and Models of Social Inclusion) and eight guiding principles (Regulatory framework, Vulnerable population, Migration, Mexicans abroad, Southern border, Northern border, Education, and Health).

We can conclude with Benhabib that “the universal right to hospitality which is due to every human person imposes upon us an *imperfect moral duty* to help and offer shelter to those whose life, limb, and well-being are endangered” (2004: 36). The universal law of hospitality is imperfect because it is conditioned to a previous law; the law of the particular interests not the common ones. So, following the Derridian premise we should be able “to transform and improve the law”:

It is a question of knowing how to transform and improve the law, and knowing if this improvement is possible within an historical space which take place *between* the Law of an unconditional hospitality, offered *a priori* to every other, to all newcomers, *whoever they may be*, and the conditional laws of a right to hospitality, without which The unconditional Law of hospitality would be in danger of remaining a pious and irresponsible desire, without form and without potency, and of even being perverted at any moment (Derrida 2001: 29).

Corollary: Mexico City, a “city of refugee”

Since I started to think of the hospitality as a limit more than a law I realized that hospitality is more a creative experience than a duty in the sense that there are various ways of understanding it and a sense of humanitarian response for some problems in particular that social networks should improve to underline the gap between an ethical policy and a rhetorical duty. Perhaps one example of this is what Derrida call “city of refugee”: “how can the host (*hôtes*) and guests of cities of refuge be helped to recreate, through work and creative activity, a living and durable network in new places and occasionally in a new language?” (Derrida 2001: 21).

A possible example of a “city of refugee” could be (in theory) Mexico City, in which the Committee for Development Planning of the Federal District adopted the *Program of Hospitality, Interculturality, Care for Migrants and Human Mobility* (2014) as part of its policies. This local administration would develop to support migrants from different countries, even internal migration, that cross the City or stayed in it. This program can set an important advance in the realization of the *Law of Interculturality, Care for Migrants and Human Mobility in the Federal District* (2012), a law that allow full access to rights and services for migrants, asylum seekers and refugees who are in Mexico City. This law and program are also the result of collective and coordinated construction between government agencies, independent human rights organizations, academia and civil society.

Chapter III. Hospitality:

Article 9.- The criterion of hospitality involves a dignified, respectful and timely treatment of those guests located in the territory of the Federal District and to facilitate their access to services and programs provided by the Federal District Government.

Article 10.- Guests are entitled to access social programs set forth by this law also the relevant public administration services. However, in case of people of greater vulnerability due to social or economic reason, The Secretariat shall adopt special measures as needed to facilitate their access thereto.

Unfortunately, in practice we are not nearby to perform this law and program because we have not solved a lot of inherent cultural and economic problems, such as racism or classism. If it is true that having a law of hospitality (which is necessary to deconstruct

because it falls into some antinomies like I explained before) could be the first step for a more revolutionary way to think of hospitality, as Derrida mentions:

Hospitality is culture itself and not simply one ethic amongst others. Insofar as it has to do with the *ethos*, that is, the residence, one's home, the familiar place of dwelling, inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner as our own or as a foreigner, *ethics is hospitality*; ethics is so thoroughly coexistence with experience of hospitality (Derrida 2001: 24-25).

The limits of hospitality, in conclusion, are more complex than a universal law, the naturalistic coexistence between each other, or even than the *Rechtslehre*. The limits of hospitality are inherent in our culture, in our language, in our familiar interpretations of the guest. The Mexican-US border isn't the exception, but there, where a geopolitical border enhances the (conditional or unconditional) hospitality, the duty of an ethical policy is more an *aporia* than a reality. That is precisely the dilemma that has to be deconstructed with creative experience instead of reject or invisibility.

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